Moody's 1994 corporate bond default study extends our default research to cover the 24 years from 1970 through 1993. This period saw 614 issuers default on the dollar equivalent of more than $93 billion. Various aspects of these defaults, including the industries affected, rating histories of defaulting issuers, and default rates by Moody's rating are presented here. Highlights of the study are:
In 1993, 38 issuers contributed $3.6 billion of publicly held, long-term debt to the defaulted debt market. With respect to both the issuer count and the amount of debt affected, these numbers more closely resemble those experienced during the mid-1980s than those of the tumultuous three-year period from 1989 through 1991. Combined with the recent increase in the size of the speculative-grade bond market, these figures helped produce the lowest speculative-grade default rate -3.1 percent -since 1981 (see Figure 11 on page 12 and Table 2 on page 19).
The year's largest defaulter was the special purpose corporation Olympia & York Water Street Finance Corporation, whose sole business concerns the office building at 55 Water Street in lower Manhattan. The slump in the New York City real estate market and asbestos contamination combined to boost lease expirations, thereby depressing the rental income from which bond payments were derived. In May, the company filed a prepackaged bankruptcy plan to hand the building over to bondholders. The default is a landmark not only because of its size relative to other 1993 defaults ($548 million or 15% of the year's total), but also because it is a rare example of a structured finance transaction in distress.
The other major defaults of 1993 in descending order of par amount of debt affected are:
• TDII Co., Inc. ($450 million), a holding company for diversified manufacturing firms. The firm filed for Chapter 11; its predecessor, Thermadyne Industries, Inc., was taken private in a 1987 LBO and is also a 1991 defaulter.
• NH Holding Incorporated ($355 million), a holding company whose principal source of income is Ampex Inc., the electronic recording and storage concern. Ampex has suffered from slack demand in the high-end analog video tape recorder market.
• Mesa Inc. ($300 million), a natural gas and oil producer. A slump in natural gas prices that began in the mid-eighties pressured the company and led to a negotiated exchange of the notes.
• Mesa Capital Corp. ($300 million), a provider of financial services to Mesa Inc.
These and other 1993 defaults are described in greater detail in a listing at the end of this report.
Of the remaining defaults, only three involved par amounts of debt equal to or exceeding $100 million, a sharp break from recent experience. The relatively small size of 1993's defaults explains the plunge in our trailing 12-month dollar-based default rate to 1.30%, a level not seen in six years. (This rate is calculated as the total par amount of debt defaulting in the previous year over the total amount of speculative-grade debt outstanding at the beginning of that year.) The issuer-based trailing 12-month default rate, which is featured on the cover of this report, closed 1993 at 3.06%, a level reminiscent of those of the mid-1980s. (This rate is calculated as the total number of Moody's-rated issuers defaulting in the preceding year over the total number of Moody's-rated, speculative-grade issuers outstanding at the beginning of that year.)
Market Overview
Accompanying 1993's relatively low speculative-grade default rate was an overall firming of the speculative-grade market's credit worthiness as reflected by 8% fewer rating downgrades and 17% more upgrades than in 1992. Among speculative-grade issuers, 1993's 97 positive rating revisions boosted the credit ratings of $75.5 billion of bonds, eclipsing the 83 downgrades that affected $32.6 billion (see Figure 1 ). Speculative-grade upgrades in 1993 were up from 83 ($50.8 billion of bonds affected) in 1992, a year which also saw speculative-grade downgrades total 90 ($44.2 billion of bonds affected).
Within the overall U.S. corporate bond market, Moody's upgraded the obligations of 163 companies in 1993 (affecting $182 billion) while the long-term ratings of 154 corporations were lowered (affecting $160 billion). In 1992, there had been only 136 upgrades ($126 billion affected) and 227 U.S. downgrades ($377 billion affected).
The excess of upgrades over downgrades in 1993 was the largest in recent memory (see Figure 2 ). Cash flow growth is accompanying the ongoing economic recovery, but seldom have fundamental improvements in an issuer's earnings outlook constituted grounds for an upgrade. Typically, credit improvements are the consequence of balance sheet restructurings, cost reductions, productivity enhancements, and the realization of stronger market positions.
Perhaps 1993's most prominent speculative-grade upgrade was Chrysler Corporation's return to investmentgrade status. Noteworthy about this revision was the company's successful development and marketing of new or redesigned products, notwithstanding the financial constraints imposed by earlier cost reduction efforts.
Among financial institutions, speculative-grade upgrades bettered 1992's 18 ($10 billion of bonds affected) and rose to 32 ($6.4 billion of bonds affected) in 1993. Reduced exposure to troubled real estate loans abetted credit quality, and the removal of problem assets lessened the uncertainty surrounding the adequacy of future debt protection, despite significant nonperforming loan write-offs. record year for overall corporate bond issuance. Excluding convertible bonds and structured financings, face-value, new issuance totaled $254.7 billion versus 1992's $213.7 billion. Issuance of speculative-grade bonds surged by 44.3% to a record $61.5 billion, including convertible securities (see Figure 3 ). The amount of newly sold Ba-rated bonds jumped by 44.3% to $26.1 billion, B-rated bond issuance climbed by 42.2% to $34.3 billion, and Caa-rated issuance jumped from 1992's $430 million to $1.1 billion. The share of total speculative-grade bond issuance consisting of less risky Ba-rated bonds remained at 1992's 42.5%.
The low interest rate environment encouraged firms to replace higher coupon debt with new bonds, thereby increasing supply. At the same time, expectations of near-term economic growth supported investor demand for high-yield, fixed income securities. It is noteworthy that, despite claims that investors were reaching for higher yields at the expense of credit risk, the percentage of newly-sold speculative-grade bonds carrying the "upper tier" rating designation, Ba, compares favorably with the meager 16.5% of total speculative grade issuance for the 1987-89 period. Nevertheless, a lower 26.8% of the $17 billion of speculative-grade bonds sold during the final quarter of 1993 were rated Ba. Moreover, in a significant departure from the ratings distribution of 1992 corporate issuance, the biggest percentage increase across all rating categories was for bonds rated B3 or lower. About $11 billion of new bonds were issued in this category, which was up by a whopping 81.8% from 1992's new supply of these extremely risky bonds.
Demand for speculative-grade issues rose in the face of voluminous new issuance, helping to generate a healthy 1993 total return of approximately 17%. Moreover, as reflected by the 65 basis points narrowing of the gap between a widely followed speculative-grade bond yield average and the 10-year Treasury yield, 1993's total return from speculative-grade bonds doubled the 8.3% total return from intermediate term Treasury securities, as well as bettering the estimated returns of 11.8% from 7-year Treasury notes and the 13.3% return from 10-year Treasuries.
Characteristics of Defaulting Issuers
As in 1992, the real estate industry claimed the largest share of defaulted debt. Three companies, Angeles Corporation, Olympia & York Water Street Finance Corp., and Trizec Corp. Ltd. defaulted on $853 million, or 24% of the year's total, reflecting a continuing weakness in North American real estate. Eight issuers in the manufacturing sector felt the weight of dwindling durable goods orders, defaulting on 20% of the year's dollar total ($733 million). The largest of these manufacturers, TDII, formerly Thermadyne Industries, defaulted on $450 million of public debt. A familiar story in the aftermath of the last decade's leveraging, TDII's late-eighties LBO precipitated a reorganization in the early nineties that was insufficient to completely relieve the onerous debt burden. Next, the energy sector contributed 19% ($685 million) of the year's total amount of defaulted debt. The lion's share of this is tied to the distressed exchanges of the oil and natural gas exploration and production firms Mesa Inc. and Mesa Capital Corp. ($300 million each). This industry last made a significant contribution to our defaulted debt totals when Columbia Gas Systems and Petrolane Inc. defaulted on $1.8 billion in 1991.
Other industries defaulting on sizable amounts of debt in 1993 were the entertainment and leisure industry (11%) and electronics (11%). Of note is the relatively minor role retailers played in 1993's defaults. Four retail defaults contributed a total of just $111 million, or 3%. This is an abrupt aboutface, as retailers led the yearly totals in 1990 and 1991, and took the number two spot in 1992. For more on the industry characteristics of defaults, see the section of this report on default rates by industry group. 
Other Aspects of Defaults
In 1993, protection from creditors was sought by 21 public debt issuers, comprising 55% of this year's defaulting issuers; total debt affected by the filers was $2.01 billion, or 56% of the year's total. This is an increase over recent experience; as 1991 and 1992 each saw about 40% of defaulters seeking protection. Perhaps this increase stems from the smaller average size of a 1993 defaulter, as smaller issuers have less cushion against business failure. Of the defaulters seeking protection, 19 filed under Chapter 11, one filed under the Canadian Companies Creditors Agreement Act, and one filed under Dutch insolvency laws.
Consistent with the pattern established over the past four years, 10 issuers, or about one-quarter of 1993 defaulters, underwent an LBO or leveraged refinancing. LBO-related defaults affected $822 million of debt, over half of which was provided by TDII. TDII was the only large, publicly financed, leveraged transaction that faltered in 1993, a sharp departure from the 1990-1992 period.
Non-U.S. issuers accounted for just 11% of the defaulted dollar amount in 1993; down from 1992 when almost 25% of the total came from non-U.S. issuers. The default of truck manufacturer, Daf, perhaps heralds a new era in European corporate financing as the supporting banks failed to rescue the troubled firm from bankruptcy. But numerous rescues continue to leave the impression that in the face of recession, "the freedom to fail" that seemed to be taking hold among European banks in 1992 has again given way to short-term solutions.
The deterioration in credit quality of defaulting issuers was generally signaled by a lowering of Moody's ratings as the default date approached. Figure 5 shows six years of median senior ratings for issuers defaulting in the last four years. Where a company had only subordinated debt rated, we implied a senior rating of one or, more typically, two rating notches higher than the rating on the subordinated debt. The decline in median ratings prior to default indicates that Moody's ratings, on average, provide ample warning that risk of default has risen. The level of risk indicated by each rating category is discussed further in the following sections.
The relatively small average dollar amount of debt affected by 1993's issuer defaults signals a return to pre-1988 patterns. Figure 6 shows the average dollar amount of public defaulted debt per issuer default from 1970 though 1993. nies. Cyclical risk is associated with the business cycle and affects both small and large firms. Hence, during periods of economic expansion, average default size is small, reflecting the effects of idiosyncratic risk on smaller firms. Periods of economic contraction introduce the cyclical component of default risk that can affect both large and small companies. During these periods, the average size of defaulting firms increases. The peak we are just now completing began in 1988, well before the recession of 1990, and suggests a structural change in the patterns of corporate financing behavior. The LBO-and merger-related financings of the mid-1980s sowed the seeds for this mountain of defaulted debt. But the average size of 1993 defaults ($95 million), lies below the 1970-93 average ($149 million) and well above the 1970-87 average of $60 million. Hence, we may see the trend to smaller company defaults continue in 1994.
Severity of Default Loss
A critical aspect of a corporate bond default is the severity of the loss incurred. Accordingly, a Moody's rating is an opinion as to both default likelihood and severity of loss in the event of default. The Moody's rating system recognizes that, eventually, most bond defaults are resolved in that bondholders receive some form of recovery. What is recovered may take the form of cash or other securities. The recovery rate, defined here as the fraction of par value returned to the bondholder, is a function of several variables. These include the seniority of the issue within the issuer's capital structure, the quality of collateral (if any), the overall state of the economy, and the market for corporate assets.
The most straightforward methodology for calculating recovery rates is not particularly practical. It would track all payments made on a defaulted debt instrument, discount them back to the date of default, and present them as a percentage of the par value of the security. But that approach requires the aging of defaults until final recovery has occurred; by the time such a study could be completed, it already would be out of date. It is impractical also due to the difficulty in valuing certain forms of payment received in place of the original obligation, including various equity and derivative instruments, certain enhancements in the terms of the surviving debt instrument, or sometimes even an asset delivered in lieu of cash payment.
For these reasons, we use the trading price of the defaulted instrument as a proxy for ultimate recovery. While it is at best a rough estimate, it is at any rate a definitive measure of the recovery realized by those debtholders who liquidate a position immediately.
Our survey of recovery prices looks at prices as a percentage of par, not as a percentage of original issue price or accreted value. An investor is entitled to receive face value at maturity, even though he may have paid somewhat less or more for the bond either at issue or in the secondary market. Expressing recoveries as a fraction of some price other than par improperly biases loss rates. The exceptions are deferred interest debt and deep discount bonds, which we removed from the sample.
We collected from several sources prices for bonds that defaulted between January 1, 1974, (the earliest point for which reliable data is available) and December 31, 1993. For each nonconvertible defaulted issue, we looked at the securitization, date of default, price one month after default, and the dollar amount outstanding at default. The entire sample comprised 719 defaulted bonds, aggregating to over $59.78 billion in face value.
Recovery estimates are calculated as the average of these prices weighted by outstanding par amount at default. These recoveries are broken out by securitization and year in Figure 7 . After default, the 102 senior secured bonds in our sample sold, on average, for $64.59 per $100 face amount; the 223 senior unsecured bonds sold for $48.38; the 175 senior subordinated bonds sold for $39.79; the 211 subordinated bonds sold for $30.00; and the eight junior subordinated bonds sold for $16.33. As expected, there is a clear pattern of declining price as priority declines.
The recovery estimate for all 719 bonds is $44.25 per $100 face value.
Recovery rates, on average, decline as priority of claim declines, lending support to Moody's practice of assigning lower ratings to an issuer's subordinated debt. Generally speaking, a bond default is an issuer-level event which will, in time, affect all of the issuer's outstanding debt obligations. That is, the probability of an issuer defaulting on a particular debt issue is independent of the seniority of that issue relative to the company's other obligations. However, holding all else constant, severity considerations suggest that, while default likelihood is the same across an issuer's bonds, the greater expected losses for its subordinated issues should be reflected in lower ratings for these issues.
(Figure 7)
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METHODOLOGY

Definition of Default
Moody's defines default as any missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal. This definition includes distressed exchanges where (i) the issuer offered bondholders a new security or package of securities containing a diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount) and (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default. Seven of 1993's defaults were distressed exchanges.
Moody's default definition also includes companies that make a delayed payment within the grace period provided in the indenture. Our rationale for including grace period defaults is straightforward, that a contractual payment was not made when due. Over the course of this year, four issuers missed interest payments on their respective due dates only to make good within the 30-day grace period. These delays amounted to involuntary one-month loans to the companies, a clear abuse of bondholders' legitimate expectations as to payment.
Moody's Rating Database
The default rates and other figures cited in this report are calculated using Moody's proprietary database of public long-term debt ratings on U.S. and non-U.S. industrial companies, utilities, financial institutions, sovereign issuers and structured finance entities. Municipal debt issuers were excluded, as were issuers with short-term debt ratings only. In total, our database includes more than 4,500 issuers that met these criteria over the past 24 years. As of January 1, 1994, the database contained long-term ratings for 3,675 non-defaulted issuers. These issuers account for the bulk of the outstanding dollar amount of U.S. public long-term corporate debt and a substantial part of public issuance abroad. Moody's default database also contains information about defaults and distressed exchanges of public issuers not rated by Moody's.
Default rates reported in this study are based on the number of debt issuers that default rather than on par amount of defaulted debt and are limited to one count for each legal entity. Separately tabulating additional issues of a single issuer would bias the results toward the default characteristics of issuers with multiple issues. Different issuers within an affiliated group of companies were counted separately because not all subsidiaries have cross-default provisions nor are affiliated companies always rated the same.
For purposes of this study, in which only the default probability component of ratings is examined, we have tried to back severity considerations out of the rating.
3 That is done by taking the rating on each company's senior unsecured debt or, if there is none, implying such a rating and using it as a proxy for default probability. In most cases, this will yield an assessment of risk that is relatively unaffected by special considerations of collateral or of position within the capital structure.
Moody's compiled the default histories used in this study from a variety of sources, including our own library of financial reports, press releases, press clippings, internal memoranda, and records of analyst contact with rated issuers. Moody's also examined documents from the Securities and Exchange Commission, The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., the New York Stock Exchange, and the American Stock Exchange. 
CORPORATE DEFAULT RATES
Major Defaults and Historical Ratings
Over the 24-year period covering 1970 through 1993, 614 corporate issuers defaulted on their long-term public debt (see Table 8 of the Appendix). Moreover, at least 20 of these companies defaulted twice over this period (see Figure 9 ). All defaulting issuers except two -Johns Manville Corporation, which was rated A3, and Columbia Gas System, which was rated Baa1 -had actual or implied speculative-grade ratings at the senior unsecured debt level at the time of default. 4 As expected, other defaulting issuers, though speculative grade at the time of default, were rated investment grade at times prior to default. The 17 defaulting issuers rated investment grade as of January 1 of the year of default are presented along with their ratings up to 20 years before default below in Table 1 . Figure 10 traces the rating history of all rated defaulting issuers from one to 20 years prior to default. It shows that at default only two issuers were rated investment grade as mentioned above. However, 17 issuers were rated investment grade on January 1 of the year they defaulted, 40 were rated investment grade at the start of the second year before default, and so on. The ratings of 21 issuers were withdrawn before they defaulted. Still looking at Figure 10 , the company with the Aaa rating as of the fourth January prior to default was Getty Oil, a subsidiary of Texaco. The default of Texaco and its affiliates stemmed from the parent's litigation with Pennzoil over the purchase of Getty Oil. As of the fifth January prior to default, both Texaco and Getty Oil were rated Aaa. Texaco and Federated Department Stores (which had completed a leveraged buyout two years prior to default) were the two companies with Aaa ratings 10 and 15 years prior to default.
4 The implied issuer rating is the rating statistically most likely to have been assigned on an issuer's senior unsecured debt had the issuer had such debt outstanding. 
Year of First Default
Defining Default Rates
In Table 8 of the appendix, we present a list of corporate issuers that have defaulted on public debt since 1970, arranged by year of default. While this list will be of interest to many investors, it cannot by itself reveal the likelihood of default associated with each rating category. Default rates, based on the experience of the entire rated corporate and sovereign bond markets, have been constructed with this in mind. They may serve investors as a guide to the risks of default associated with Moody's ratings and as indicators of market stress.
The default rates presented here and in the appendix are calculated with the issuer as the unit of study, rather than on the basis of outstanding dollar amounts. The numerator consists of the number of rated-issuer defaults in a given time period. The denominator used is the number of rated issuers at the start of the time period. This approach places equal weight on large and small issuers, under the rationale that the number of rating decisions (or in the case of an investor, buy/sell decisions) does not rise with the size of the issuer.
One-Year Default Rates
A widely reported default statistic is the one-year speculative-grade default rate. Moody's calculates this rate by dividing the number of rated issuers defaulting over a calendar year by the number of (non-defaulted) speculativegrade rated issuers outstanding at the beginning of the year. Figure 11 plots one-year speculative-grade default rates from 1970 through 1993. The peak in 1970, at 10.9 percent, corresponds to the then marketshaking default of Penn Central Railroad and its 30 affiliates. The most recent peaks, 1990's 8.8 percent and 1991's 9.5 percent, reflect the effects of a recession and a shake-out of the eight-year borrowing binge that began in 1982. Table 2 presents one-year default rates for each broad rating category from 1970 through 1993. To arrive at these default rates, we compute the number of defaulting issuers with a given rating at the beginning of that year and divide this by the number of outstanding issuers with the same rating on January 1. The last two rows of Table 2 give the one-year issuer default rates for investment-grade issuers and speculative-grade issuers, respectively. Note that for all but eight of the past 24 years, the one-year issuer default rate for investment-grade sector was zero.
Our weighted average default rates provide point estimates of the probability of default for a particular rating class. For example, the average one-year default rates displayed in Figure 12 climb from 0.00 percent for issuers rated Aaa to 8.31 percent for issuers rated single B. To calculate these statistics, we take the sum across years of defaulting issuers that held a particular rating at the beginning of each year and divide this by the sum across years of outstanding issuers with the same rating on January 1. By this methodology, an average of 4.48 percent of speculative-grade issuers defaulted within one year over the last 24 years, compared with 0.05 percent of investment-grade issuers.
Moody's refined its rating categories in 1982 by adding numerical modifiers. Table 3 and Figure 13 suggest that the relationship between ratings and default likelihood also holds generally for issuers ranked by numerical-rating category. Default rates climb from 0.00 percent for Aaa-rated issuers to 16.24 percent for issuers rated B3.
Multi-Year Default Rates
One-year issuer default rates are the most commonly reported. But some corporate bond investors find more relevant summaries of issuer experience in cumulative default rates over representative time horizons. The construction of multi-year default rates parallels that for one-year default rates, except that we follow the members of cohorts for longer periods. Thus, an average cumulative default rate indicates the share of a portfolio of bonds formed at a given date that can be expected to subsequently default. Table 5 traces annually for up to 20 years the cumulative default rates of cohorts of Moody'srated issuers formed at the beginning of each year from 1970 through 1993. Cohort groups are separated by Moody's rating categories to answer, for example, the question "What percent of Brated issuers with bonds outstanding as of January 1, 1983 defaulted by 1993?" The answer is found in the last row and last column of the section labeled "Cohort Formed January 1, 1983": 45.7 percent. The first column of each subsection, by definition, is the one-year issuer default rate and corresponds to that year's entry in Table 2 .
Some other studies look at cohorts of bonds issued during a given year and track the bonds' subsequent performance. In contrast, Moody's approach, which forms cohorts of all Moody's-rated issuers with debt outstanding at January 1 of each year, provides an indicator of the experience of a portfolio of both seasoned and new-issue bonds purchased in a given year. Table 4 described in detail in the Appendix, presents default rates by rating category for investment horizons spanning one to twenty years. It shows that the higher default risk for lower rating categories remains evident as one considers investment periods exceeding one year. For example, as seen in Figure  14 , average default rates for five-year holding periods climb from 0.1 percent for issuers rated Aaa to 28.4 percent for issuers rated B. Figure 14 also shows that the pattern recurs for average default rates for 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year holding periods. Table 7 shows cumulative default rates -up to 5 years -for the modified ratings.
Throughout the study period, there is a s sharp distinction between companies in the low-investment-grade Baa category and companies in the upper-speculativegrade Ba category. In the past 24 years, Ba companies have been two to ten times more prone to default than Baa-rated companies, over any time horizon. And with a one year investment horizon, B-rated companies have been over four times more prone to default than Ba-rated companies.
Default Rate Volatility
The default rates highlighted in this report represent point estimates of default likelihood over varying time horizons. Because realized default rates are themselves random draws from the "true" population of default rates, our default rate averages approximate the true mean default rates associated with each rating category and time horizon. A parameter designed to help characterize the shape of the distribution generating actual default experience is the sample standard deviation. We present in Table 6 standard deviations of default rates by rating category and time horizon, up to 20 years. Each point in this figure represents the standard deviation of cumulative default rates across those cohorts with histories spanning the indicated time horizon.
The results demonstrate a greater default rate volatility at lower rating categories. That is, not only are default rates higher on average at the low end of the rating scale, but realizations of default rates are more volatile and less predictable over any given investment horizon. For example, standard deviations of one-year default rates for the investment-grade categories run as low as 0.00 percent for the Aaa category and as high as 0.29 percent for the Baa rating. The Baa standard deviation peaks at 2.05 percent for the 11-year investment horizon. But at the Ba level, standard deviations range as low as 1.89 percent at one year and as high as 7.59 percent at year eight. Standard deviations for single-B rated issuers peak at 9.5 percent at year nine.
Default Rates by Industry Group
Moody's ongoing default research documents the high correlation between rating and default risk. As the database expands, patterns of defaulting issuer characteristics emerge and invite new comparisons. Yet database limitations, classification difficulties, and small sample sizes make some statistical comparisons hazardous. With this in mind, we carefully approach the concept of industry-specific default rates. 
Weighted Average One-Year Default Rates
Ideally, default rates for a given rating category over any time period, investment horizon and sector will be equal in magnitude. But the reality of the ratings process is that short-term shocks affect some sectors more than others. Moreover, such a shock may affect one geographic region with a heavy concentration of a particular industry more than another. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, even if short-term weakness is anticipated for a particular industry, wholesale downgradings would be confusing and disruptive. By design, the rating time horizon is often longer than many business cycles. Figure 15 presents weighted average one-year default rates for selected industries. At the start of each year, 1970 through 1993, we formed cohorts by industry group and rating category and followed them for one year. Each bar is found as the sum across cohorts of issuer defaults for a particular industry and rating, divided by the sum of issuers from all cohorts for that industry and rating.The results are sorted in order of increasing B default rate.
With few exceptions, one-year default rates rise as rating level drops. For example, within each industry the default rate for issuers rated B exceeds that for all other rating categories. Moreover, inter-industry comparisons reveal a consistency in the level of risk associated with a particular rating across sectors. Excluding deposit institutions, the single-B default rates vary surprisingly little as one moves from industry to industry. 5
Forecasting Default Rates
In this section, we will demonstrate how to use historical default rates to derive a forecast for 1994 speculative-grade default rates. We will assume that the default risk attributed to a particular rating category tends toward its historical average value.
The forecast starts with an expected default rate -the default rate that one would expect if the set of issuers currently rated within each grade were to default at the historical average rate for that rating class. For example, as of January 1, 1994, there were 336 non-defaulted issuers rated B at the senior level. Based on our historical statistics, we expect 8.31 percent, or 28 of these 336 issuers, to default during 1994. Repeating this process for each rating category and summing the results, we expect 46 rated issuers to default in 1994, amounting to 5.5 percent of all speculativegrade issuers.
Next we adjust this expectation to reflect a median real economic growth forecast for the year 1994, compiled by Blue Chip Economic Indicators as of January 10, 1994 . The survey respondents forecast 1994 real GDP growth at 3.0 percent. To factor this into our model, we constructed a simple regression model with actual default rates as the dependent variable and expected default rates and economic growth as the independent variables, where the coefficient on the expected default rate was constrained to be unity. The model was estimated for the period 1971 through 1993, omitting the highly unusual performance of 1970 and incorporating early estimates of actual 1993 full year economic growth. Using the coefficients of the model and the above information, we forecast a 1994 speculative grade default rate of 4.56 percent. Although this would mark an increase from 1993's 3.1 percent default rate, it is very much in line with the 1970-
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5 Deposit institution defaults consisted principally of thrifts. The single-B default rate is relatively high in part because we present it as a weighted average. The weighting places most importance on the past several years as the number of rated thrifts grew explosively in the eighties. This combined with three years of trouble with the S&Ls produced the abnormally high default rate presented. Figure 16 presents plots of the actual one-year speculative-grade default rate, the calculated expected default rate and the fitted default rate. The fitted value for the year 1994 includes the GDP forecast and shows a slight increase for 1994 over 1993. This is mainly due to the increase in the share of speculative-grade issuers holding the single-B rating to 40 percent from January 1, 1993's 37 percent. Issuers rated Ba saw their share fall from 59 percent at the start of 1993 to 55 percent. A greater concentration of lower-rated speculative grade companies, all else equal, raises the expected default rate and the default forecast.
APPENDIX
Weighted-Average Cumulative Default Rates
In this appendix we outline the methodology used to calculate corporate bond default rates. Let m Y t (R) be the number of issuers from the cohort composed of all outstanding issuers with rating R at the start of year Y (Y=1970, 1971,...) , that defaulted in the t th year after cohort Y was formed. And let n Y t (R) be the number of issuers from the same cohort that have not defaulted by year t.
7 The weighted-average marginal default rate, dt (R), is the average issuer-weighted probability of default for R-rated issuers in their t th year, given no prior default. Here, T restricts the summations to only those cohorts for which t years of history are available. The weighted-average marginal survival rate, (1 -dt (R)), is the probability of survival past the t th year, given survival past year t-1.
The t th year average cumulative survival rate for rating R, denoted here by St (R), is the probability that an issuer does not default by year t. It is found by taking the product of the intervening average marginal survival rates:
. We denote the weighted-average cumulative default rate, for a given rating category R and a given number of years t, by Dt (R). It estimates the fraction of an initial population of issuers that has historically defaulted within t years of having the rating R. As the average cumulative survival rate is the probability that an issuer has not defaulted in each year leading up to t, the average cumulative default rate is its complement:
Dt (R) = 1 -St (R) .
Specifically, Dt (R) summarizes historical default experience through the t th year as a function of marginal default rates. In particular, the one-year average cumulative default rate equals the one year average marginal default rate:
The above specification suggests a simple means to convert a T-year cumulative default rate into an "average" one-year default rate. That is, in the special case where the marginal default rate is assumed to be the same year over year, (dj (R) = dk (R) for every j and k), we have
Cumulative Default Rates
The cumulative default rates, shown in Table 5 
Average Cumulative Loss Rates
The methods used to calculate average marginal and average cumulative default rates generalize to loss rates. Loss rates factor in the severity of default in addition to the likelihood of default. We indicate the expected recovery rate, in the event of default, by the symbol µ and note that the expected severity rate is simply (1-µ).
Algebraically, the expected loss is the product of the probability of default and the expected severity of default. In particular, the average marginal loss rate l t (R) for any period t is the product
Extending our definition of the average cumulative default rate, we define the average cumulative loss rate L t (R) . Note that L t (R) represents the expected loss of principal and coupon (as a fraction of par) by period t. It is not, however, an estimate of the present value of future losses. A forthcoming Special Report, Default Rates and the Term Structure of Credit Risk, presents an approach to bond pricing that uses the default and recovery rates presented in this report and takes into account the time value of money. Figure 17 below depicts the behavior of average cumulative loss rates, by rating category, for investment horizons spanning 1 to 20 years, assuming a fixed recovery rate of 44¢ on the dollar.
7 Previously, we did not exclude issuers defaulting in the intervening years. 8 Since these default rates (and all default rates derived from them) will be, in some sense, averages, we will simply denote them by "average" rather than the more cumbersome "weighted average". Table 2 One-Year Default Rates by Year and Rating 1970-1993 (Percent) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Table 5 Cumulative Table 7 Average 
Average Cumulative Loss Rates by Rating Category
Supermarket operator $50 million 13% Senior Secured Notes due 2000
• Almac's Inc., incorporated in Delaware in 1989, owns and operates 44 full-line supermarkets in Rhode Island and Massachusetts; their 32 Rhode Island stores comprise that state's leading supermarket chain. In 1989, the present Almac's was formed through purchases of assets and the assumption of liabilities of the predecessor company of the same name and the Rhode Island Produce Company. Since then, Almac's has undertaken an extensive remodeling and acquisition program that modernized properties, maximized each stores selling area, and increased the number of stores by 11. Almac's also significantly reduced costs by replacing the predecessor Almac's company-owned warehouse and distribution facilities with a supply agreement with Wetterau Incorporated. Since 1990, when sales grew by 17.4% and gross profit by 27.2% over the predecessor's results, sales have slowly deteriorated-largely due to increased competition and a weak economy. In 1991, sales dropped by $9.1 million dollars to $541.7 million, then in 1992 by $37.2 million to $504.5 million. Through cost cutting measures, Almac's was able to increase 1991 gross profits from $127.7 million to $141.2 million. Despite considerable debt incurred in the 1989 purchase-over $100 million-in 1991, the new Almac's produced its first positive net income: $600,000. With the sharp drop in 1992 sales, Almac's saw its gross profits fall back to $135.6 million and its net income plummet to a $3.2 million loss. During the first half of 1993, sales fell another 16.3% and operating profit fell to $1.2 million, 76.3% lower than the comparable 1992 figure. Yet the firm owed $5.9 million in interest payments over the period. • Angeles Corporation is a real estate investment concern with 1992 revenues of $46.6 million. Its primary lines of business are: property management (13% of 1992 revenues), real estate investment advisory services (12% of 1992 revenues), factory outlet shopping malls (23% of 1992 revenues), and congregate-type senior housing (36% of 1992 revenues). These interests are spread throughout the United States with no notable regional concentration. Yet the sour real estate market of the last several years has depressed both prices and rents and, consequently, Angeles' cash flow. Despite this environment, Angeles launched a capital-intensive expansion into the congregate-type senior housing market in 1989. Successful communities of this type usually need to be carried for about four years before they can stand on their own. But the recession of 1990 worsened business conditions and further restrained Angeles' profitability. In 1989, total assets were $135.2 million while longterm debt stood at $68.9 million. Through an aggressive debt-financed expansion, the same measures climbed to $290.9 million and $242.6 million, respectively, by FY 1992. As earnings declined and long-term debt mounted, the ratio of EBIT to interest expense sagged from 0. ("Partners"), in the face of recessionary contractions in its core businesses. Lebow, chairman, CEO, and president of Brooke, controlled an 84% interest in Brooke through Partners via majority interest of one of its general partners. Through creative rearrangement of the Brooke family tree, Partners was now able to meet its interest expense through pre-tax earnings, instead of up-streamed dividends. Lawsuits ensued alleging LeBow to be manipulating Brooke to his gain and the detriment of minority stockholders. Partners controlled a variety of businesses; the two most notable were 69.9%-owned MAI Systems Corp. ("MAI"), a mini-computer manufacturer and software provider, and 43.4%-owned New Valley Corp. ("New Valley", formerly Western Union Corp.), a provider of transaction services and electronic delivery of messages. MAI was an underperforming company that subsequently defaulted on $40 million of public debt in Feb. 1992 . At the time of the merger, New Valley was already laden with over $570 million of defaulted debt. Partners carried a sizable debt burden of its own, and the merger boosted Brooke's total long-term debt by over 13X from $33.5 to $439.4 million. The new businesses failed to contribute to Brooke's cash flow. A healthy FY1990 EBIT/interest expense ratio of 8.69 quickly deteriorated to .93 in the following comparable period; it has since remained below 0.5. With the merger, total debt/EBITDA jumped from .59 to 4.54. Operating profit as a percent of sales fell from a pre-merger 11.4% to a post merger 6.6%. On operating losses, the following year this ratio plummeted to -3.3%, reflecting Brooke's inability to efficiently incorporate the merged businesses. 
Bucyrus-Erie Company
Mining equipment manufacturer $74.6 mil 16% Senior Reset Notes due 1996 $0.80 mil 9% Sinking Fund Debentures due 1999
• The management of Bucyrus-Erie Company formed B-E Holdings in May 1986 in anticipation of the LBO it led in February 1988. B-E Holdings has no other business activities other than as a holding company and certain members of the senior management of Bucyrus-Erie owned all of its common stock prior to their exercise of B-E Holdings warrants in the first quarter of 1992. Bucyrus-Erie is a leading worldwide manufacturer of surface mining machines and their replacements parts. The company's primary markets are: coal mining (70%), hard rock mining (20%), and phosphate production (10%). Despite an industry-wide surge in demand, an accompanying increase in the company's backlogs, and strong market position, Bucyrus-Erie has failed to produce a positive return since the 1988 LBO. The industry's characteristically volatile demand for capital investment, intense competition and the company's own expensive capital structure have combined to restrain profitability. In the wake of the LBO, interest expense quintupled from $4.9 million in 1987 to $26.4 million for the 12 months ended September 1992. Despite a 79% increase in sales over the same period, EBITDA/Interest Expense slumped from 1.47 in 1987 to 1.14 in 1992 while Total Debt/Book Capitalization rocketed from 0.12 to 1.34. In February, B-E Holdings and Bucyrus-Erie announced a financial restructuring that included the omission of several of Bucyrus-Erie's June and July 1993 interest payments. Bucyrus-Erie also declared that it would not advance funds to B-E Holdings for payment of its debt obligations. • Cherokee Inc. ("Cherokee"), formally known as Green Acquisition Co., was originally formed by Deutschman Clayton in 1989 to acquire the Cherokee Group Inc. ("Group") in a leveraged buyout. The company, engaged in the design and the manufacture of apparel and footwear goods, came out of the acquisition with a high debt burden representing almost 80% of book capitalization. Positioned principally in moderately priced segments of the highly competitive and volatile fashion industry, Group was seriously affected by the soft retail environment. Although sales increased in fiscal 1991, operating margins were under pressure due to intense competition triggered by the economic slowdown. Fiscal 1992 was dramatic for the company. Sales plummeted 18% to $195 million due to the loss of business in private label markets and a decrease in demand from key customers. Interest coverage tests narrowed, both as a result of the erosion of internal cash flow and a coupon reset on the senior subordinated discount notes to 15.5% from 9% in May 1992, increasing annual interest expense by approximately $6 million. Faced with a liquidity problem, Group proposed an exchange offer, which, however, had failed by mid-summer. Left undercapitalized, Group announced that it would miss payment on $8.2 million of interest due in November. Having no access to external credit facilities, Group and consequently Cherokee, filed for protection under bankruptcy law. • Organized in 1980, The Cooper Companies is involved in a variety of health product and service businesses. Contact lenses have been the company's main product since exiting the surgical and diagnostic equipment market in late 1988. In 1990, TCC began a plan of diversification and debt reduction in order to protect against the changing economic climate. The company acquired various rights to certain ophthalmic and surgical products and processes, increasing the scope of TCC's newly formed operating subsidiaries, CooperVision Pharmaceuticals and CooperSurgical. In May 1992, TCC acquired Hospital Group of America from Nu-Med, Inc., which provides psychiatric and substance abuse treatment; at the same time, TCC entered into an agreement with Nu-Med to manage additional special-care facilities. Until recently, revenues had fallen from 1989's pre-diversification levels; 1989's $52.8 million in revenues dropped to $35.5 million by 1991 before picking up to $63.3 million in 1992, lifted substantially by HGA. SGA expenses have remained insupportably high over these years, annually averaging 95.3% of total revenues, in parts reflecting both lower-than-expected results of the acquired businesses and large legal fees and other litigation costs. By 1991, TCC reduced total debt by over 50% from 1989's $102.9 million, although the 1992 acquisitions slightly increased indebtedness to $58.6 million. Despite a steep drop in interest expense, the ratio of EBIT to interest expense remained volatile and unfavorable: -.37, .68, -2.44, and -.88, for the fiscal periods 1989 through 1992, respectively. Stockholders' equity, which buoyed the company over this loss-making period, has been successively depleted from its 1989 peak of $101.7 million to $46.3 at year-end 1992; cash and cash equivalents have been used to cover interest payments, as well as to reduce debt and fund acquisitions. In the first half of 1993, TCC has seen results comparable with the period six months earlier, depleting equity an additional 46.9% to $24.6 million. Litigation alleging this issue's price manipulation hangs over TCC. Daf N.V.
Commercial vehicle manufacturer Fl 150 mil 6.75% Debentures due 1996 (US $81.2 mil)
• Daf N.V. is western Europe's sixth largest truck producer with total employment of 12,650 as of February 2, 1993 (down from 16,600 in 1987). Major production plants are located in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom and the company's European distribution system is expansive with 1,300 sales and service outlets. A severe recession in European commercial vehicle demand began in 1990 and has continued through the present. Especially hard hit has been the UK wherein sales of trucks (gross vehicle weight above 3.5 tons) have contracted by more than half from their 1989 levels. Despite an ongoing restructuring effort set in motion after the 1987 takeover of British Leyland, sales plummeted along with demand, resulting in 1990 losses of Fl 150 million, 1991 losses of Fl 395 million and 1992 losses of Fl 257 million. During this period, Daf invested nearly £170 million in design and development of a new range of medium-heavy duty trucks, and was struggling with modernizing the aging van manufacturing plant it had acquired in the 1987 takeover. The outlays strained the firm's cash flow and impinged on its ability to service more than Fl 1 billion of long-term debt. 1992 marked the fourth year of declining or flat demand in most of Europe and left Daf scrambling for short-term financing from banks and the Dutch and Belgian governments. When the banks wouldn't lift a freeze on credit, the governments also became reluctant to extend financing. On Erly Industries, Inc.
Processor and distributor of food products $8.9 mil 12.5% Subordinated Sinking Fund Debentures due 1993
• Erly Industries' principal businesses are the milling and worldwide sale of rice, and the processing, bottling, and sale of juices. The company operates its rice business through subsidiary Comet Rice, one of the largest rice millers in the U.S. Erly's juice operations are conducted via subsidiary Erly Juice, whose market share is far smaller than Tropicana or Minute Maid, their largest competitors. The rice business, which historically has accounted for the largest portion of sales, has been adversely affected by a number of factors. In FY92 higher rough-rice costs and lower domestic and international demand increased competition on both the purchase and sales sides of the business; though sales only contracted by 2%, the increased selling expense contributed to a 57.4% plunge in operating profits. Despite a 6% increase in volume sales in FY93, a 16% decline in average sales price reduced revenues by 21%, resulting in an operating loss. Similar problems in the juice sector were even more injurious as Erly's small market share limited its ability to weather large fluctuations of fruit prices. In the past five years the ratio of EBIT to interest expense has averaged less than 60%, and the company has relied on numerous asset sales to service its interest expenses. In FY93, Erly sold both its Greenville, MS, rice plant and its wholly-owned subsidiary, TreeSweet of Puerto Rico, using proceeds to pay down debt. FY94 has seen more asset sales with the disposition of the Aqaba Packaging Co. in Aqaba, Jordan. Despite these maneuvers, Erly did not have sufficient funds to meet the obligations of its subordinated debentures which matured in Dec. • Glendale Federal Bank, Federal Savings Bank ("Glendale"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenfed Inc., is the nation's fifth largest saving's bank, with $17.9 billion in total assets at fiscal year end 1992. The bank was actively involved in the origination of income property & construction loans and, through its commercial finance subsidiaries, commercial loans. By 1990, mounting non-performing commercial loans induced the company to "re-center" its activities about what it considered to be its core business: residential real estate and consumer banking. While Glendale moved ahead aggressively to accomplish its goal, the languishing California real estate market, the concurrent economic slowdown, and a substantial residual commercial loan portfolio united to boost loan delinquencies and led to sizable increases in loan loss reserves. Nonperforming assets leapt from just over $300 million in 1989 to over $750 million by mid-1992. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 1992, Glendale registered a $120.9 million loss and was nearly $400 million shy of the special regulatory minimum capital requirements established for Glendale. Since March 1992, Glendale has been unable to comply with the risk-based capital requirements specified under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. FIRREA's phase-out schedules excluded $43.7 million of goodwill, as well as $11.6 million of investments in subsidiaries, from Glendale's core & riskbased capital by January 1, 1993. Glendale also fell out of compliance with FIRREA's core capital requirement. This brought the bank to within $42.1 million of the 2% tangible equity requirement, below which the Office of Thrift Supervision is required, with some exceptions, to place a bank in conservatorship or receivership. In an effort to increase its capital, Glendale undertook a restructuring that included an exchange offer of noncumulative preferred stock and warrants for the subordinated notes and amendments to certain indentures of the nontendered notes. This substantially diminished Glendale's financial obligation to the noteholders.
01/27/93-Announced exchanged offer. 
Great American Communications Company
Holding company $40.5 mil 14.375% Senior Subordinated Notes due 1999 $2.2 mil 11% Senior Notes due 1995 $0.7 mil 9% Senior Debentures due 1993
• Great American Communications Company, 40.3% owned by American Financial Corporation, is a holding company engaged primarily in the ownership and operation of television and radio stations and, until December 1991, the production of animated television programs and feature films. During 1987, a year in which sales reached $95 million, GACC incurred substantial debt when it acquired Taft Broadcasting Corp. for $1.5 billion. The company's cash flow proved insufficient to meet the additional interest expense, prompting asset sales. The Gulf War (which dampened advertising outlays), the recent recession, and heightened competition for advertising expenditures from cable companies constricted GACC's 1991 earnings, thereby spurring an acceleration of asset sales. 1991 divestitures included Spelling Entertainment ($108 million), a 13% interest in Black Entertainment Television ($37 million), and Hanna-Barbera Productions ($320 million). As a result, total debt decreased from $1.1 billion at year-end 1990 to $0.7 billion at year-end 1991. However, the depressed market for media-related properties made asset sales in 1992 less attractive than in previous years while earnings remained sluggish. Though 1992 revenues staged a modest come-back, total debt still totaled 6.8 times EBITDA, which in turn, represented only 1.31 times interest expense. In February 1993, the company announced that it would file a prepackaged plan of reorganization. • Gulf USA Corporation, formerly Gulf Resources & Chemical Corporation, was organized in 1956 and grew into a diversified natural resource and energy company. Since 1984, however, the company has disposed of nearly all of its original natural resource and energy businesses, keeping just the bituminous coal mining operation. In 1989 Gulf began to invest heavily in international commercial real estate, especially in New Zealand. The combination of commercial real estate and coal mining offered Gulf few synergistic advantages. Sales from coal mining (65% of the 1991 total: $72.7 million) came under pressure in the 1980s from environmental legislation & liabilities. Tighter clean air statutes stifled demand for higher-sulfur coal while industry production remained stable, driving down coal prices. Also, Gulf has been named a potentially responsible party in the Bunker Hill Superfund Site. The firm took a $29.5 million charge in 1989 for its estimated liability and has increased reserves for environmental matters to over $33.0 million. The second blow was dealt by the soft commercial real estate environment that accompanied the global recession underway in 1990. Gulf's aggressive real estate acquisition strategy included sizable debt-financed acquisitions. Over the period 1987 to 1992, total long-term debt more than doubled from $96.1 million to $202.4 million while EBIT declined from $59.5 million in 1987 to ($0.6) million for the 12 months ending September 1992. Total debt/ EBITDA rocketed over the same period from 1.3 to 21.4 at the same time that working capital to long-term debt plunged from 1.72 to -0.08. In March, Gulf announced that it had failed to make interest payments on its 12.5% subordinated sinking fund debentures due in 2004 and that it anticipated missing interest on its 10.875% subordinated sinking fund debentures due in 1997. 
Healthco International Inc.
Dental equipment provider $275,000 7% Senior Subordinated Notes due 2011
• Healthco International has, until recently, been North America's largest supplier of dental care products. Healthco underwent a leveraged buyout in 1991 that burdened the company with considerable debt. Restructurings necessary to lower expenses, primarily through downsizing and inventory control, were never adequately implemented. Subsequently, the company was not able to meet its financing requirements and filed for Chapter 11 on June 10, 1993 . It is presently attempting to raise funds through asset sales.
06/10/93-Filed for protection under Chapter 11. (Moody's contact: Randal Gaulke) 
Hexcel Corporation
Manufacturer of structural materials $25.6 mil 7% Convertible Subordinated Debentures due 2011 • Hexcel, founded in 1946 , is the leading producer of honeycomb and other lightweight structural materials worldwide. The primary market for Hexcel's products is the aerospace industry. U.S. sales account for more than half the company's revenues. Over the period from 1989 to 1993, the company faced a slew of postponed and canceled orders, first from the U.S. military then from the battered aerospace industry, resulting in plant underutilization and lower margins. In March 1992, on projections of weak sales and depressed earnings, Hexcel sold its U.S. fine chemicals business and used the proceeds to pay down debt. In December of the same year, the company initiated a restructuring program designed to address its overcapacity and took a charge of $23.5 million. The restructuring continued into April 1993, when the company closed its Graham, Texas plant. However, these measures failed to stem the continuing deterioration of gross margins, which had fallen from 29.6% in 1988 to 17.4% for the first three quarters of 1993, and prompted the company to record an additional $50 million restructuring charge in the 3rd quarter. As earnings have fallen, Hexcel's interest expense coverage has worsened as exhibited by the plunge in the ratio of EBIT to interest expense from 4.53 at year-end 1988, to .65 in 1992, and Iverson designs, manufactures, services, and supports IBM-standard microcomputers and related products, primarily in the U.S.; the company also adapts systems to the TEMPEST standard used by the U.S. government for security purposes. Historically the firm's income has been almost totally derived from a few large federal government contracts. Revenues have fallen dramatically from a 1989 peak of $60.3 million due to the reduction of two major government contracts in 1990, and subsequent loss of these contracts in 1991. Foreseeing the end of these contracts, Iverson expanded its commercial product line and embarked on new methods of distribution in 1990. However, these new ventures failed to compensate for the lost government business and in 1992, Iverson began to dispose of non-performing assets. Sales in the first half of 1993 amounted to just $1.3 million. The ratio of EBIT to interest expense reflected the company's decline; in 1989 this ratio stood at 1.94, but in 1990 plunged to -.29, in 1991 to -4.57, and -5.62 in 1992 . On Nov. 8, 1993 , the company filed to solicit acceptances from its stockholders and debentureholders for a pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
06 • Jamesway Corporation operates 108 discount department stores in the Mid-Atlantic region, retailing a wide variety of products, from dresses to drills. The last layer of their burdensome debt structure was added in 1989 at a time when income was as high as $10 million and expenses were well managed. However, Jamesway saw its income drop to just under $4 million in 1990, then to losses of over $17 million in 1991, as selling, general, and administrative expenses grew. In 1992 Jamesway closed 14 stores, 13 due to unprofitability, thus beginning a modest restructuring and remodeling. Provision for this restructuring totaled over $48 million dollars. Despite the closures, '92 sales stayed about even with the prior year's $855 million. 1993 sales, however, have been weak. In the first quarter of 1993, sales decreased 14% to $157.7 million; net loss rose from $3.4 million to $8 million. The decreases in number of stores and per store sales were coupled with a rise in seasonal borrowings and higher interest rates. In early July of this year vendors stopped shipping goods amidst concerns over the company's financial viability. Largely to insure the availability of merchandise for the start of the stronger retail seasons, Jamesway filed for Chapter 11 on July 19. JWP Inc.
Electrical and mechanical services contractor $7.0 mil 7.75% Convertible Subordinated Debentures due 2012
• JWP Inc. is a multinational corporation providing technical services concerning complex facility and information systems. With over 220 offices and 22,000 employees, JWP offers a broad variety of consulting, construction, and maintenance services. The company also supplies water through two subsidiaries, Jamaica Water Supply and Sea Cliff Water Co., to almost 700,000 New York State residents. Over the last ten years, JWP has enjoyed steady healthy growth; perceptive forecastings of market developments were reflected in profitable expansions. In the late eighties this growth accelerated explosively; revenues grew 88% and 62% in 1989 and 1990, respectively . This sudden expansion compromised JWP's ability to monitor itself and its roles in the international marketplace, and they soon confronted the global recession unprepared. A sharp downturn in worldwide commercial construction in the early nineties contributed to a 27.7% drop in gross margin by third quarter 1992. Thus ended years of consistently rising operating profits with a loss of $132 million. A healthy EBITDA/interest expense of 3.57 at year end 1991 had plunged to -3.09 by September of the next year. A proposed prepackaged bankruptcy plan calls for no more interest or principal payments on this issue.
09 • When MEI Diversified Inc. ("MEI") was organized in 1986, its principal operations were in the snack food business. In mid-1990, MEI sold nearly all of the snack food related assets of its subsidiaries, acquired NDM Acquisition Corp. (a manufacturer of medical products) and launched into the beauty salon business by acquiring interests in The Glemby Company, Inc., Essanelle Salon Co., and Maxim's Beauty Salons, Inc. The more than 1,650 salons are operated though the 80% owned subsidiary MEI Salon Corp. The salon buyout put in place an expensive capital structure and strained the already weakened coverage ratios as illustrated by the decline in EBIT/interest from 0.54 in 1989 to 0.06 in 1990. After a year of erratic earnings for MEI Salons, MEI filed an action against the former Glemby shareholders alleging "fraudulent misrepresentation" and "omission of material facts" made in connection with the Glemby acquisition. In May 1992, MEI also filed a suit against Regis Corporation (20% owner of MEI Salons) citing mismanagement, fraud, and more. As the lawsuits dragged on, profits and financial ratios worsened for MEI until September 1992, when operating cash flow could no longer meet interest expense and capital expenditures. This shortage led to asset sales and signaled that a capital infusion was needed. In November 1992, MEI announced that it had received a non-binding letter of intent from IMR Fund, L.P., to acquire a 42% stake in return for $26.7 million cash and $40 million of shares in Brown-Minneapolis Tank 
Mesa Inc.
Exploration for & production of oil & gas $300 mil 13.5% Subordinated Notes due 1999
• Mesa Inc. is one of the largest independent oil and gas companies in the United States. It explores for and extracts natural gas (67% of 1992's total revenue) and oil primarily from on-shore, domestic fields. A prolonged slump in natural gas prices has adversely affected Mesa's balance sheet. Since 1983, when Mesa sold gas for an average price of $2.92 per thousand cubic feet, its average sale prices have fallen 42% to $1.70 per thousand cubic feet. The consequent decline in earnings compelled Mesa, in 1991, to undergo a restructuring of $914 million in bank debt through the sale of assets and secured notes. Deflated gas prices continued to weaken Mesa's balance sheet throughout 1992. From FY 1987 through FY 1992 , operating profit sank from $68.5 million to $26.2 million. Over the same time period, Total Debt/EBITDA doubled from 3.7 to 7.6. In 1992, production and price forecasts indicated that operating cash flow would be insufficient to fund both operations and the company's $1.24 billion of long-term debt through 1996. This lead Mesa to launch an effort to restructure its $600 million of subordinated notes later that year. While a tentative agreement with a majority of bondholders has been reached, negotiations are ongoing. 
Microsemi Corporation
Manufacturer of semiconductors & assemblies $33.3 mil 5.875% Convertible Subordinated Debentures due 2012
• Microsemi Corporation is a leading supplier of high-reliability power semiconductor products and surface mount assemblies. Historically, Microsemi has derived the majority of its income from sales to aeronautics and defense related companies. The subordination of defense industry profits to transient government policies motivated the company to attempt to diversify into commercially-oriented sales. To achieve this goal, Microsemi adopted a strategy based on the acquisition of smaller, underperforming niche companies in the semiconductor sector. In order to fund this expansion, Microsemi issued $40.3 million of convertible subordinated debentures in February 1987. By early 1989, 17 such acquisitions had been effected and nearly all of them needed a turnaround. At many of these companies, the desired turnaround never materialized while at the same time, defense industry orders began to fall off. Subsequently, the company's liquidity tightened, compelling it to adopt a "plan of disposition" in 1989 that was expanded in 1990 to target 10 of the subsidiaries. In partial fulfillment of the plan, five subsidiaries were sold or closed, imposing $8.97 million, $11.0 million and $0.651 million charges for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 respectively. Over the same period, debt as a percentage of total capitalization surged from 61% to 83%. The remaining companies named in the plan continued to hobble Microsemi with losses close to $4 million in 1992. On February 23, 1993, Microsemi announced that it was experiencing cash shortages as a result of certain non-recurring payments and that it was severely curtailing cash outflows. On March 1, 1993, it announced that it would omit interest payments due on its 5.875% convertible subordinated debentures. • Minstar, originally incorporated in Minnesota in 1962 and then reincorporated in Delaware in 1985, manufactures and distributes recreational power boats through its wholly owned subsidiary, Genmar Industries, Inc. Genmar, Minstar's principal source of revenues, produces one of the largest lines of boats in the U.S. with approximately 250 models, distributed under trademarks Wellcraft, Hatteras, Larson, and others. In 1988, IJ Holdings, a privately held corporation, completed a friendly LBO of Minstar acquiring 84% of Minstar's outstanding common stock in exchange for the debentures. Since 1988, when sales hit a record high, boat manufacturers have seen industry-wide sales fall by 50%. The market's contraction is attributable to a number of causes, including the luxury tax of 1990, but the greatest drain has been the weak economy and the associated lack of consumer demand for big ticket luxury items. Sales began a rapid decline in 1989 that only modestly rebounded in 1992; by this time sales were less than half their 1988 level. EBIT/interest expense, which stood at 1.8 at year-end 1988, dropped each successive year, to 1 in 1989, then to .1 in 1990; in 1991 this ratio fell below zero, and has stayed there since. Minstar is currently negotiating a comprehensive financial restructuring. • NH Holding Incorporated, formerly Ampex Group Inc., is a privately held holding company whose principal assets consist of an 80% equity stake in another holding company, Ampex Inc. Ampex, through its operating subsidiaries, is a leading worldwide producer of high-performance scanning recording systems and associated magnetic tape media for television, data storage, and government markets. Throughout Ampex's nearly 50-year history, it has amassed more than 1,700 patents. Historically, NH has relied on dividend payments from Ampex to service its debt. Hence, a turn in the profitability of Ampex induced the financing difficulties at NH. Since Ampex's 1992 IPO, sales have plummeted from $526 million in FY 1991 to $429 million in FY 1992; first quarter 1993 revenues are equally low, amounting to just 81% of the comparable 1992 figure. These poor results reflect, in part, the continuing decline in the high performance analog video tape recorder market; in the first quarter of 1992 such sales accounted for 22.5% of revenues, while in the same period of 1993, video recorders portioned only 14.2% of revenues. Net loss in the first quarter of 1992 was $10 million; in the same quarter 1993 net loss was $20.7 million. In response to the company's performance problems, Ampex undertook an operational and financial restructuring that has reorganized and consolidated the operating subsidiaries and, among other maneuvers, eliminated dividends on the companies' common stock. Consequently, NH's cash flow decreased materially. • Norsk Data A.S is a Norwegian holding company with over fifty wholly and partly owned subsidiaries and minority interests located throughout Northern Europe. These holdings produce and service computers, supply service products, sell and maintain large data systems, and perform a variety of related functions. Norsk derives approximately half of its revenues from its domestic operations. For the fifteen years 1973 to 1988, Norsk enjoyed an average compounded revenue growth rate of over 38%. Such rapid growth, though, left Norsk unable to implement the changes that were necessary to exploit the rapid developments in the computer industry of the late eighties; though service and support income continued to rise, decreasing computer sales and reorganization costs took a heavy toll. Over the past five years the company has continually restructured operations in an attempt to regain profitability, repeatedly downsizing through the sale of operations and subsidiaries. Over the years 1988 through 1992, total assets fell from NKr5.2 billion to NKr740 million, with the greatest relative fall of almost 55% from 1991 to 1992. Over the same period, revenues too dropped from NKr2.93 billion to NKr1.17 billion, with a plummet of 37% at the end of the period. 
NVF Company
Manufacturer of industrial materials $48.1 mil 5% Debentures due 1994 $11.4 mil 10% Debentures due 2003
• NVF Company, incorporated in 1904, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of industrial laminated plastics and vulcanized fiber. Through its largest subsidiary, APL Corporation (68.1% owned), NVF also manufactures and sells metal products for select industrial markets, sells housewares and containers made of plastic, and designs, produces, and sells wood cabinets for residential use. NVF is not the leading producer of any of its products and a slow economy has restrained its ability to generate revenues. The years 1990 through 1992 saw a steady decline in operating revenues from $236.4 million to $205.4 million to $162.7 million. Over this same period EBITDA remained steady at approximately -$19.3 million. During this time cash flow insufficiencies adversely affected NVF's operations. Limited credit terms, high prices for raw materials, and plant inefficiencies due to a lack of said materials, contributed to the decreases in sales. APL's wood cabinets segment substantially contracted in 1992 with the suspension of operations at their Lancaster, Ohio plant. An already strained current assets to current liabilities of .54 in 1991, sank to .26 in 1992. In 1993 NVF was confronted with over $70 million in maturing longterm debt. With access to additional financing hurt by years of negative cash flow, the company was unable to meet its obligations.
01 • Olympia & York Water Street Finance Corp. is a special purpose corporation whose sole business concerns the office building located at 55 Water Street in lower Manhattan. It is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Olympia & York Developments Limited, a privately held real estate and investment holding company based in Toronto which is now operating under Canadian bankruptcy protection. Fifty-Five Water Street is among the largest office buildings in New York City with 3.6 million square feet of rentable space and its own postal zip-code. The company has been hit hard by a depressed New York City real estate market and significant lease expirations. In addition, the property has an asbestos problem that is estimated to cost at least $20 per square foot to correct. The asbestos problem renders the office space more difficult to sell while the sluggish real estate market ensures that any tenants that do rent space can demand lower rent. Exacerbating the situation are the financial problems of the parent company as it undergoes a restructuring under the Canadian Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. In May of 1992, the company announced that it would no longer be able to make debt payments and that it would not provide any of the money needed to improve the building. In August 1992, Water Street began negotiations with bondholders that led to the May 1993 filing of a prepackaged Chapter 11.
05/07/93-Filed a prepackaged plan for reorganization under Chapter 11. 
Synergy Group Incorporated
Propane distributor $85.0 mil 11.625% Senior Subordinated Notes due 1997
• Synergy Group Incorporated is a privately held company whose principal business is retail propane distribution. Synergy sells its products through retail branches located in the Southeast, South-central, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeastern regions of the United States. In terms of gallonage, points of distribution, and size of customer base, the company is among the 10 or so largest multi-state retail propane distributors in the United States. Proceeds from the 1987 sale of the above listed notes served to reduce existing bank debt and finance a propane distribution business acquisitions campaign. The expansion strategy did not materially boost operating income but did increase interest expense, exacerbating Synergy's poor profitability. Synergy's interest expense coverage deteriorated as evidenced by the plunge in EBITDA/Interest Expense from 4.9 in 1987 to just 0.4 in 1990. A spate of unusually warm winters in the early '90s weakened business conditions for the entire industry. The accompanying slack demand depressed propane prices, further restraining Synergy's profitability. The ratio of EBITDA to Interest Expense remained at 0.4 through FY 1992, increasing financial stress. • TDII, formerly known as Thermadyne Industries Inc., is a Clayton, Missouri, holding company which, through nine holding subsidiaries, owns numerous manufacturing companies. The burdensome debt structure acquired in the 1987 LBO of PALCO Industries forced TDII to restructure debts in 1991. Though no interest payments have been missed since the last recapitalization, on Dec. 2, 1993, the company filed a prepackaged plan of reorganization under Ch.11 protection in order to take advantage of low interest rates. • The Triangle Corporation, incorporated in 1967 in Delaware, is a leading manufacturer of hand tools which it sells under the UTICA, BONNY, DIAMOND and UTICA-SWISS brand names in the United States and under EREM in Europe and in other parts of the world. The company also believes itself to be the largest provider of farrier (horseshoer) tools in the United States. The 1991 recession heightened the stiff competition already existing in the hand tool market (85% of Triangle's income). The accompanying sluggishness of orders strained the company's cash flow which was further adversely affected by a work stoppage at the company's Duluth Minnesota manufacturing facility. In order to improve the company's worsening margin, an operational restructuring and refinancing was undertaken in early 1991. Triangle sold its special tools business to reduce outstanding bank debt. Covenants in the 13.75% senior subordinated debentures prohibited a refinancing which would have breached the minimum fixed charge coverage ratio. So the company purchased $10 million of the $25 million outstanding and simultaneously amended certain covenants of the debentures to allow for extra refinancing. In addition, the company rescheduled notes payable to the former shareholders of EREM and in March 1992 paid off the balance of its industrial revenue bonds. Tool sales remained slow throughout the lethargic recovery of 1992 and the restructuring measures proved not to be sufficient to improve margins or deleverage the firm. Trizec Corporation Ltd.
